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ABSTRACT
When it comes to young healthy women “donating” their eggs,
America has a regulation problem. This Note explains the science
behind the harvesting of human eggs, focusing on potential egg do-
nors, and describes the specific factors that make egg donation a
unique type of transaction. It describes the current regulatory status
of the assisted reproductive technology industry in the United States
and highlights the ways in which this scheme fails to protect egg
“donors.” This Note concludes with a call for comprehensive regula-
tion of the assisted reproductive technology industry.
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INTRODUCTION
A. Jessica Schneider’s Story1
Jessica Schneider was an ideal egg donor: a Stanford University gradu-
ate, an elegant former model, and an artistic film producer.2 She was musi-
cally inclined and a talented composer, singer, pianist, and guitar player.3
And, at six feet tall, she was equally athletic.4 When Schneider decided to
become an egg donor, she was reassured by the fact that the in vitro fertili-
1. Jennifer Schneider, It’s Time for an Egg Donor Registry and Long-term Follow Up,
RECORD OF TESTIMONY AT A CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING ON HUMAN EGG
TRAFFICKING ON NOV. 14, 2007 (Mar. 3, 2008, 1:09 PM), https://www.donor
siblingregistry.com/sites/default/files/images/docs/cgs.pdf.
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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zation clinic she chose was well respected within the community.5 In dis-
cussing her decision to donate, Schneider explained to her mother, “[t]here
are some risks associated with the procedure, such as bleeding or infection,
and that’s about it.”6 After Schneider’s donated eggs resulted in a preg-
nancy, she became an even more desirable donor and was offered double the
price to donate a second time.7 Later, she completed a third and final dona-
tion cycle.8
While pursuing a master’s degree in filmmaking, Schneider developed
abdominal pain.9 Her doctors diagnosed advanced colon cancer, a rare af-
fliction among twenty-nine year olds.10 She dropped out of her graduate
program to begin treatment for the cancer in her colon. It subsequently
spread to her bones and brain, requiring chemotherapy, massive surgery,
and radiation.11 Ultimately, the cancer made its way to her lungs, resulting
in a gradual loss of her ability to breathe.12 After battling for two years,
Schneider died of cancer at the young age of thirty-one.13 In 2003, Jessica’s
oncologist said there was no evidence to support a connection between ova-
rian hyper-stimulation and colon cancer.14 Today, we know differently.15
Jessica Schneider was the victim of America’s failed regulatory scheme.
She voluntarily became an egg donor, but she was denied the information
and support structure she needed to make a reasoned decision. She had no
access to studies evaluating the health risks of egg donation, and she en-
gaged in a transaction where there was—and remains—little opportunity
for true informed consent. Furthermore, she fell prey to coercive compensa-
tion and aggressive consumer marketing. The regulatory scheme that applies
to egg donors in the United States does not protect vulnerable women like
Jessica. It needs to change.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2.
15. Jennifer H. Lin & Edward Giovannucci, Sex Hormones and Colorectal Cancer: What
Have We Learned So Far?, 102 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1746, 1746 (2010) (“Patients
who received treatment with gonadotropin-releasing hormone agonists or
orchiectomy had a 30%–40% increased risk of developing colorectal cancer relative
to those patients who did not have the therapies.”).
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B. Approach and Focus of This Note
According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
assisted reproductive technology (ART) “includes all fertility treatments in
which both sperm and eggs are handled.”16 Egg donation is not required in
all forms of ART, but it is required for a subset of ART called “collaborative
reproduction,” which is the focus of this Note. Collaborative reproduction
is the use of “eggs, sperm, or embryos of a third party to create a child
biologically unrelated to at least one intending parent.”17 By definition, the
donation of an egg, or sperm, or both, is needed for collaborative reproduc-
tion.18 The most common type of ART is in vitro fertilization (IVF),19
where the sperm fertilizes the egg outside of the womb, making an embryo;
the embryo is then implanted into the womb.20 When the egg or sperm or
both come from a third party, the IVF is considered collaborative
reproduction.
“Donor” nomenclature and variations of this term are standard within
the ART field. However, this paper purposefully does not use this term as a
call to scrutinize its use. Instead, this Note will use variations of the term
“supplier” in order to more accurately describe the nature of a woman’s
actions in what is commonly referred to as “egg donation.” In a minority of
instances, third–party women provide human eggs without any kind of
compensation or remuneration;21 in those circumstances they are in fact
“donors.” Yet in most circumstances, these women are not actually donors
but instead are provided with compensation, either for their services or dis-
comfort, or in direct payment for the eggs procured.22 To put it accurately,
then, these women are not “donors” in any sense of the word, but paid
“suppliers” of eggs. It is important to acknowledge this distinction between
donors and suppliers, because compensation fundamentally changes the na-
16. What is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVEN-
TION, http://www.cdc.gov/art/whatis.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
17. Helen M. Alvare´, The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children’s
Rights Perspective, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1 (2003).
18. Id.
19. NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, 2013
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT
3 (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2013-report/art-2013-fertility-clinic-re
port.pdf [hereinafter 2013 FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT].
20. In vitro fertilization (IVF), MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-proce
dures/in-vitro-fertilization/home/ovc-20206838 (last visited Aug. 23, 2016).
21. See Jacoba Urist, How Much Should a Woman Be Paid for Her Eggs?, THE ATLANTIC
(Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/11/how-much-
should-a-woman-be-paid-for-her-eggs/414142/.
22. See id. (drawing attention to how there is little consensus over what the financial
compensation is actually for).
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ture of the transaction. The donor nomenclature hides the compensation
element, which raises issues of societal distaste and significant ethical
debate.23
Rather than propose specific legislative reforms needed in the ART
industry, I will focus on the failures of the current regulatory scheme in the
ART industry and how the unique characteristics of this field justify its
further regulation. This Note will focus on the egg harvesting process from
the perspective of female egg suppliers. By placing attention on prospective
egg suppliers, I am concerned with those women who are unacquainted
with the egg recipient and are not an intended parent of the resulting off-
spring.24 There are other important interests involved in collaborative repro-
duction that will not be addressed here, such as those of the future
offspring, the gamete recipient, and the general public.
This Note explains the science behind the harvesting of human eggs,
focusing on the profile of potential egg suppliers, and details the specific
factors that make egg harvesting a unique type of transaction. It also de-
scribes the current regulatory status of the assisted reproductive technology
industry in the United States and highlights how this scheme has failed to
protect egg suppliers. Taken together, this provides the justification for and
a call for comprehensive regulation of the assisted reproductive technology
industry.
I. THE SCIENCE BEHIND EGG HARVESTING PROCEDURES
To fully appreciate why women providing eggs to others for reproduc-
tion should be regulated in ways that it currently is not, it is important to
understand the medical procedures involved in such a decision. Once a
woman decides to become an egg supplier, she undergoes a two-phase med-
ical treatment that is completed over the course of a month.25 The first stage
23. See generally Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte
Donation, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 107 (2001) (discussing the merits of regulating oo-
cyte donor compensation); Michael Hiltzik, Should We Pay Women to Donate Their
Eggs for Research? No, and Here’s Why, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2016), http://www.la
times.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-egg-donors-20160722-snap-story.html.
24. The intention of individuals to be parents prior to the ART treatments is legally
significant and helps to determine parental rights for the child later, at least in some
states. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 668–70 (Cal. 2005). But see,
C. M. v. C. C., 377 A.2d 821 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. Cumberland Cnty, N.J. 1977)
(granting visitation rights to plaintiff, biological father, who donated sperm to an
unmarried woman).
25. Margaret R. Sobota, Note, The Price of Life: $50,000 for an Egg, Why Not $1,500 for
a Kidney? An Argument to Establish a Market for Organ Procurement Similar to the
Current Market for Human Egg Procurement, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1225, 1243 (2004).
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is called ovarian hyper-stimulation or super-ovulation.26 In this stage, the
supplier takes a series of hormone medications, causing her body to deviate
from the natural menstruation process that produces a single egg per cycle,
and instead produces ten to twenty eggs in a single cycle.27 Some of the
hormone medications used in super-ovulation are administered through
daily injections.28 In the last five days of the hormonal treatments, the sup-
plier is monitored with near-daily blood tests and ultrasounds to determine
precisely when the eggs have matured.29 A final injection of human chori-
onic gonadotropin (hCG) is administered and the second stage, called egg
retrieval, begins in the following twenty-four to forty-eight hours.30 The
supplier undergoes transvaginal ultrasound aspiration, a surgical procedure
in which the doctor removes the mature eggs from the supplier’s body while
she is under conscious sedation.31 Guided by a transvaginal ultrasound, a
doctor uses a suctioning needle to physically remove the oocytes from the
follicles within her ovaries.32
A. Physical Health Risks of Egg Harvesting Procedures
The process of super-ovulation and egg retrieval is invasive. It is classi-
fied as a surgery33 and carries concomitant health risks, only some of which
are known. Mildred Cho, of the Stanford University Center for Biomedical
Ethics in California, advocates for more research to uncover these risks, be-
cause it is “important for people to understand in the consent process that
we don’t know as much as we should about what those risks are.”34 Further-
more, Louise Brinton, of the U.S. National Cancer Institute, has completed
preliminary studies of the associated cancer risks, but she is convinced that
the risk analysis is incomplete.35
26. Stanford University, The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, THE EGG DONOR IN-
FORMATION PROJECT, http://www.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/eggdonor/
procedures.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2016).
27. Brittany L. Marvin, Regulating the Procurement of Female Gametes: Donors’ Health
and Safety, 16 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 117, 122 (2011).
28. The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 26.
29. Sobota, supra note 25, at 1243.
30. Marvin, supra note 27, at 122.
31. The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 26.
32. Id.
33. Id.; Hiltzik, supra note 23.
34. Helen Pearson, Health Effects of Egg Donation May Take Decades to Emerge, 422 NA-
TURE 607 (2006), http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v442/n7103/full/
442607a.html.
35. Id.
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Some known short-term effects from ovarian hyper-stimulation in-
clude swelling, bruising, and menopause-like symptoms.36 Certain com-
monly used, FDA-approved fertility drugs reportedly cause a litany of side
effects: rashes, burning sensations, tingling, migraines, hives, hair loss, severe
joint pain, difficulty breathing, chest pain, nausea, depression, fainting, am-
nesia, hypertension, rapid heart rate, muscle pain, bone pain, abdominal
pain, insomnia, chronic enlargement of the thyroid, liver function abnor-
mality, anxiety, and vertigo.37 Other complications include adnexal torsion,
a condition where a drug-stimulated ovary changes its position in such a
way that cuts off its blood supply.38 This serious condition requires medical
intervention to untwist or remove the affected ovary, thus affecting an egg
supplier’s fertility and ability to have her own children in the future.39
It is also possible for egg suppliers to contract ovarian hyper-stimula-
tion syndrome (OHSS).40 This syndrome may present symptoms ranging
from mild to severe, commonly requiring hospitalization.41 Symptoms in-
clude fluid build-up in the chest and abdomen, difficulty breathing, kidney
damage, and blood clotting disorders, which can result in permanent injury
or even death.42 The risk of OHSS is positively correlated with higher doses
of the hormonal injections,43 which are critical to produce eggs ten to
twenty times greater than the body’s cycle would naturally produce; these
risks increase for younger women.44
Increased risk for colon cancer has been conclusively linked to hor-
mone therapies that include gonadotropin, a hormone used in the egg har-
vesting procedure to induce the expulsion of ovum in the final days of
ovarian hyper-stimulation.45 The use of this hormone increases the risk for
colon cancer by thirty to forty percent compared to those patients who did
36. The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 26.
37. Judy Norsigian, Egg Donation Dangers, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS,
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/ViewPage.aspx?pageId=103 (last vis-
ited Sept. 12, 2016).
38. The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 26.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Practice Comm., Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome,
90 FERTILITY & STERILITY S188, S188–89 (2008) [hereinafter Ovarian Hyperstimu-
lation Syndrome].
42. Alison Motluk, The Human Egg Trade: How Canada’s Fertility Laws Are Failing Do-
nors, Doctors, and Patients, THE WALRUS, Apr. 12, 2010, at 35, https://thewalrus.ca/
the-human-egg-trade.
43. Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome, supra note 41, at S188.
44. Id. at S191.
45. The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 26.
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not have this type of hormone therapy.46 Super-ovulation may also be corre-
lated with ovarian cancer; the risk for a woman who undergoes ovarian
stimulation is double that of a woman who does not.47 The risk of ovarian
cancer increases even more if a woman does not get pregnant,48 and particu-
larly if she uses certain fertility drugs for more than twelve months.49 Ac-
cording to a 2003 study, ovarian hyper-stimulation may have the capacity to
cause serious pulmonary, neurological and hematological complications.50
This summarizes the known serious risks posed by the invasive procedure of
egg harvesting; there may remain risks as yet unknown.
B. Egg Supplier Profile
The ART industry revolves around the egg recipient, and therefore not
a lot of information is collected about the egg suppliers.51 However, we
know that egg suppliers are generally young, healthy women.52 The health
and age of the supplier are significant factors in ensuring the health of the
provided eggs.53 In an effort to maintain some quality control, organizations
that connect egg suppliers with fertility clinics will put potential donors
46. Jennifer H. Lin & Edward Giovannucci, Sex Hormones and Colorectal Cancer: What
Have We Learned So Far?, 102 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1746, 1746 (2010) (“Patients
who received treatment with gonadotrophin-releasing hormone agonists or
orchiectomy had a 30%–40% increased risk of developing colorectal cancer relative
to those who did not have the therapies.”).
47. John W. Malo, Ovulation Induction and Cancer, GA. REPROD. SPECIALISTS, http://
www.ivf.com/ovca.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2016) (explaining that the incidence
of ovarian cancer in the general population is low, typically 1–1.8%, while the life-
time risk is approximately 4–5% among women who have taken ovulation-inducing
medications).
48. Id. (noting that pregnancy following ovarian stimulation seems to have ameliorating
effects, and that those who are exposed to the fertility hormones but later get preg-
nant do not have the same risk multiplier).
49. The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 26 (stating that women who use
the non-naturally occurring fertility drug clomiphene for more than one year in-
crease their risk of ovarian cancer).
50. Victoria Uroz & Lucia Guerra, Donation of Eggs in Assisted Reproduction and In-
formed Consent, 28 MED. & L. 565, 569 (2009).
51. See 2013 FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT, supra note 19, at 8 (noting
that the only information collected about egg suppliers is their age); Sarah B. Angel,
The Value of the Human Egg: An Analysis of Risk and Reward in Stem Cell Research, 22
BERKLEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 183, 199-200 (2013) (noting the scant information
about egg suppliers).
52. EMILY GALPERN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: OVERVIEW AND PER-
SPECTIVE USING A REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE FRAMEWORK 16 (2007) http://
www.geneticsandsociety.org/downloads/ART.pdf.
53. Id.
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through various screening tests prior to approving them for the process.54
For example, these tests might include a fertility screening to check the
health of the ovaries; medical screening for general health, blood type, infec-
tious disease, and sexually transmitted infections; genetic screening for risks
of hereditary or family disease; and psychological screening to ensure the
egg provider is prepared to make her decision to become a supplier.55
The physiological reality is that fertility is related to age.56 The peak of
fertility generally occurs in women between the age of twenty-three and
thirty-one.57 At thirty-one, your fertility begins to decline quickly.58 At
thirty-nine, your chances of conceiving are half what they were at thirty-
one, and by forty-two, they decrease by fifty percent again.59 Modern
medicine and technology have not been able to change this fact of nature.60
In 2013, the average egg supplier was twenty-six years old.61
Beyond health and age, other important qualifications for an egg sup-
plier are often egg recipient-specific.62 Egg recipients tend to want children
that will look like themselves.63 Moreover, egg recipients are often willing to
pay more for eggs from a supplier with specific traits, such as high SAT
scores, athletic ability, etc.64 Seventy-five percent of egg suppliers are college
students, because they are “likely to be young, healthy, and in need of
money.”65 Furthermore, it is evident that there is a socioeconomic differ-
ence between the women who are receiving the eggs, who are affluent and
54. The Big Business of Egg Donation, ABC NEWS, Nov. 6, 2015, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=8zV8SVLMP1w.
55. See, e.g., The Donation Process, EGG DONOR AMERICA, https://www.eggdonor
america.com/become-egg-donor/the-donation-process (last visited Aug. 25, 2016)
(describing its egg supplier screening process); The Big Business of Egg Donation,
supra note 54.
56. Christie Aschwanden, Fertility 101, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/baby/fea
tures/fertility-101#1 (last visited Sept. 11, 2016).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 2013 FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT, supra note 19, at, at 8.
62. See Sandra G. Boodman, Egg Donation Demand Soars, but Many Long-Term Effects
Unknown, THE RUNDOWN (June 21, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/run
down/egg-donation-demand-soars-but-many-long-term-effects-unknown/(stating
that people are willing to spend more money to find a donor with particular traits).
63. The Big Business of Egg Donation, supra note 54.
64. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, $50,000 Offered to Tall, Smart Egg Donor, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
3, 1999), www.nytimes.com/1999/03/03/us/50000-offered-to-tall-smart-egg-donor.
html.
65. GALPERN, supra note 52, at 16.
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can afford to undergo costly, elective procedures, and the women who are
supplying the eggs, who are often financially stressed.66
II EGG HARVESTING IS A UNIQUE TRANSACTION THAT CANNOT
COMPARE TO OTHER MEDICAL TREATMENTS
Unique attributes of ART create a high risk of undue influence on
potential donors and justify a greater need for government intervention.
The fertility clinics’ opportunity for huge profits at the expense of egg sup-
pliers, the conflict of interest that ART medical doctors face, and the ro-
manticized rhetoric surrounding ART all contribute to an unusual and
highly manipulative transactional environment.
The most important difference between egg harvesting and other
medical procedures is the unique circumstance wherein egg supplier patients
receive, instead of remit, payments for a medical procedure. Whether the
compensation is a “direct” payment for eggs or is limited to compensation
commensurate with time and inconvenience, the financial aspect of this
transaction fundamentally changes the assumptions we have about doctor-
patient relationships. Third party egg donors are young, healthy women
who are exposed to the physical and psychological risks of this procedure in
exchange for money. The nature of the procedure is non-therapeutic; it
confers no curative health benefit in exchange for exposure to risk. Instead,
it confers risk in exchange for financial compensation. Super-ovulation and
egg retrieval from egg suppliers are not the only non-therapeutic medical
treatments, but they are the only treatments where patients actually earn
income.67
As a result of this exposure to risk, suppliers also create an opportunity
for fertility clinics to make large profits. There is a sizeable demand for ART
services in the United States.68 “Of the approximately 61 million women
aged fifteen to forty-four in 2011–2013, about 6.9 million, or 11%, had
66. EVELINA WEIDMAN STERLING & ELLEN SARASOHN GLAZER, HAVING YOUR BABY
THROUGH EGG DONATION 291 (2nd ed.2013), https://books.google.com/
books?id=cownXvUUE0oC&pg=PA291&lpg=PA291&dq=socioeconomic+egg+do
nor&source=bl&ots=1xG0lscOIV&sig=i_b03gsRPPg-60j0n7Q8D4o8dYE&hl=en
&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiQ-_nw7NLOAhXCPB4KHdFACG4Q6AEISTAE#v=one
page&q=socioeconomic&f=false.
67. Cf. Bridget J. Crawford, Taxation, Pregnancy, and Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 327, 333 (2010) (arguing that replenishable bodily fluids like blood
plasma and breast milk are ordinary assets for income tax purposes, while body parts
such as kidneys and lungs may not be, because they are not replenishable. This
analogy may extend to sperm and egg donations).
68. Justine Durrell, Women’s Eggs: Exceptional Endings, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J.
187, 216 (2011) (“demand far outstrips the current human egg supply”).
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received infertility services at some time in their lives.”69 The CDC de-
scribes a woman as infertile when she has been unable to get pregnant in
more than twelve months.70 In 2010, about 1.5 million, or 12%, of married
women between the ages fifteen and forty-four were infertile based on this
definition.71 According to the CDC, in 2014, 208,604 ART cycles were
performed across 458 reporting clinics in the United States.72 A 2014 study
of the global market for ART services demonstrated that North America
dominated the global market, and accounted for $8.6 billion in revenue.73
Furthermore, demand for ART services is expanding beyond just infertile
women to include male homosexual couples.74
Access to the collaborative reproduction marketplace requires finding
women willing to assume the risks associated with supplying their eggs in
exchange for payment. Further limiting this group is the fact that ideal egg
suppliers are between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-four years old.75
This is important because diminished fertility is linked with advanced age.76
During egg harvesting, clinicians seek to produce ten to twenty follicles in a
single cycle.77 On average, an ART cycle in the United States costs infertile
couples $12,400.78 Some couples spend as much as $100,000 before
69. 2013 FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT, supra note 19, at 3.
70. Id. at 528.
71. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2011 FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS
RATES REPORT 3 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES
REPORT].
72. ART Success Rates, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.
gov/art/artdata/index.html (last updated June 21, 2006).
73. Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Market Analysis By Procedures (Frozen Non-
Donor, Frozen Donor, Fresh Donor, Fresh Non-Don’t, Embryo/Egg Banking) And Seg-
ment Forecasts to 2022, GRAND VIEW RESEARCH (2016), http://www.grandviewre-
search.com/industry-analysis/assisted-reproductive-technology-market.
74. See Debora Spar, Where Babies Come From: Supply and Demand in an Infant Market-
place, HARV. BUS. REV. (2006), https://hbr.org/2006/02/where-babies-come-from-
supply-and-demand-in-an-infant-marketplace (noting that homosexual couples in-
terested in having offspring related to both parents would be in high demand of
reproductive services).
75. Practice Comm., Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Recommendations for Gamete and
Embryo Donation: A Committee Opinion, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 47, 55 (2012)
[hereinafter Recommendations for Gamete and Embryo Donation]. See supra Section
I.B.
76. See Lisa M. Luetkemeyer, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse and What Are They Doing
with the Eggs (and Sperm)? A Call for Increased Regulation of Gamete Donation and
Long-Term Tracking of Donor Gametes, 3 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 397,
400 (2010).
77. Marvin, supra note 27, at 122.
78. Frequently Asked Questions About Infertility Q06: Is Infertility Expensive?, AM. SOC’Y
FOR REPROD. MED., https://www.asrm.org/awards/index.aspx?id=3012 (last visited
Aug. 20, 2016).
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conceiving or giving up.79 Therefore, each time an egg supplier is approved,
she represents an average of $120,000–$240,000 of potential gross income
for a fertility clinic. Furthermore, the fertility industry has grown quickly
during a short period of time. In 1986, there were only 100 fertility clinics
in the United States, but in the last two decades, these clinics have more
than quadrupled to 428 clinics.80 In the same time period, their revenues
have grown sixty fold, from $41 million to almost $3 billion.81 In fact, the
market is even larger than these statistics suggest because these values ex-
clude payment to third party beneficiaries of the fertility market: attorneys,
consultants, counselors, equipment manufacturers, and suppliers.82 The fact
that American health insurance companies largely consider infertility to be a
socially-constructed need and IVF to be an experimental treatment83 facili-
tates the growth of the industry’s private players. These companies’ profits
are not restricted by insurance reimbursement rates or other regulatory price
ceilings, so they can maximize profit potential based on demand.84 The
CDC reported that in 2011, the average egg supplier was twenty-eight years
old,85 and use of supplier eggs resulted in a pregnancy success rate of
54.8%.86 Even in comparison to the most successful age group of patients
who use their own eggs, supplier pregnancy success rates are at least eight
percentage points higher.87 This means that using third-party-supplier eggs
is generally more successful than interested party eggs, and thus more profit-
able for fertility clinics. As a consequence, fertility clinics highly value the
egg supplier market.
Arthur Caplan, director of the division of medical ethics at New York
University’s School of Medicine says that ART is “a field characterized by
79. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66
WASH & LEE L. REV. 203, 213 (2009).
80. Id. at 212.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 212–13.
83. Ahmad O. Hammoud, M.D., et al., In Vitro Fertilization Availability and Utilization
in the United States: A Study of Demographic, Social, and Economic Factors, 91 FERTIL-
ITY AND STERILITY 1630, 1634 (2009).
84. See, e.g., ISLAT Working Group, ART into Science: Regulation of Fertility Techniques,
281 SCIENCE 651 (1998) (stating that the ART industry amasses over $2 billion in
the United States in annual revenue and has been accessed by infertile couples in the
United States at a rate of 1 in 6, demonstrating the rapid growth of ART on a
national scale).
85. 2011 FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT, supra note 71, at 8.
86. Id. at 24. A pregnancy success rate indicates the percentage of embryo transfers re-
sulting in live births.
87. Id. (demonstrating that the pregnancy success rate per transfer for women under
thirty-five using their own eggs was 46.0% as compared to the 54.8% success rate
when women use donor eggs).
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strong anti-regulatory sentiment because it evolved as a business, not a re-
search enterprise.”88 Medical doctors working at a fertility clinic must navi-
gate a conflict of interest between their employer and the egg supplier
patient. They do not comfortably fit within the legal understanding of the
physician-patient relationship, which assumes a context of neutrality, objec-
tivity, and non-ideological motivation in furthering the patients’ best inter-
ests.89 As employees of fertility clinics, the physicians’ compensation
depends on the continued success of the clinic. The fertility clinic has much
to gain financially by completing any given ART cycle, which creates an
interest in harvesting as many third-party-supplier eggs as possible. Medical
doctors take an oath to act in the best interests of their patients, the egg
suppliers. Sometimes, because the ART cycles have significant health risks,
it is in the patient’s best interest to terminate the cycle without reaching the
egg retrieval stage. When that situation arises, it creates a direct conflict
between the physician’s Hippocratic oath and the economic interests of the
fertility clinic. Commenters highlight the need for short- and long-term
clinical studies on the effects of ovarian hyper-stimulation and egg retrieval
on egg suppliers.90 This conflict of interest may account for the lack of
scientific evidence available regarding the effects of or increased risks created
by the egg harvesting procedures.91 Considering that the first “test-tube”
baby was born more than three decades ago in 1978,92 it is tempting to
explain the persisting dearth of research on health effects as neglect of pa-
tients in service of industry self-interest. It is plain that fertility clinics’ busi-
ness model discourages the pursuit of long-term studies that may clarify and
confirm the risks that they impose on their patients.93
Another characteristic that separates collaborative reproduction from
other medical procedures is the romanticized rhetoric that follows the
88. Michael Ollove, Lightly Regulated In Vitro Fertilization Yields Thousands of Babies
Annually, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
health-science/lightly-regulated-in-vitro-fertilization-yields-thousands-of-babies-an-
nually/2015/04/13/f1f3fa36-d8a2-11e4-8103-fa84725dbf9d_story.html.
89. See Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the “Experts”: From Deference to Abdication
Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 654–55 (1992).
90. See W. Kramer, J. Schneider, and N. Schultz, U.S. Oocyte Donors: A Retrospective
Study of Medical and Psychosocial Issues 6 HUMAN REPROD. 3148–49 (2009), http://
humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/6/1503.short; Hiltzik, supra note 23.
91. COMM. ON ASSESSING THE MED. RISKS OF HUMAN OOCYTE DONATION FOR STEM
CELL RESEARCH, WORKSHOP REPORT 4 (Linda Giudice, et al. eds., 2007), http://
www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11832&page=4 (calling for the accumula-
tion of extensive health data from women whose eggs are harvested and monitoring
the long term effects of the procedure); Hiltzik, supra note 23.
92. ‘Test-tube baby’ Brown Hails Pioneers on 35th Birthday, B.B.C. NEWS (Jul. 25, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-23448665.
93. Durrell, supra note 68, at 220.
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baby-making industry.94 There is a trend demonstrated by different players
involved in assisted reproductive technology to sentimentalize the industry.
Suppliers, physicians, egg broker agencies and others across the industry
exhibit a “pretense that profit-seeking and market forces are, at best, secon-
dary considerations in matters so sacred as reproduction and parenthood.”95
This is evidenced in the names of egg brokers and agencies: for example,
“Creative Love Egg Donation,”96 “Happy Beginnings,”97 “First Smile Egg
Donation Agency,”98 and “Graceful Conception.”99 They also use psycho-
logically-manipulative marketing language such as: “Congratulations! You
are taking the first step in creating a miracle. How often do you get to be a
part of something so spectacular?;”100 “Parenthood is magical, it is a gift, a
miracle!;”101 “Sharing the gift of life.”102 In the words of physicians at Bos-
ton IVF, “our greatest honor is knowing that at least one of our patients
fulfills their dream of becoming a parent every day of every year.”103 This
romanticized rhetoric is reflected in the egg supplier psyche—altruism is
one of the primary motivating factors potential egg suppliers profess in
mental health pre-screenings.104 They describe their feelings with statements
such as, “I know somebody who can’t have a child. I want to help some-
body.”105 This sort of rhetoric pervades the ART industry marketing mate-
rial and has the effect of diverting attention away from the financial
incentives at work in the industry.
The industry targets healthy young women because they possess the
only available source of eggs. Considering the huge market demand for such
94. Melanie Thernstrom, Meet the Twiblings, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Dec. 29, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/magazine/02babymaking-t.html (comment-
ing on how this romanticism sickened a woman seeking a donor).
95. Krawiec, supra note 79, at 213.
96. CREATIVE LOVE EGG DONOR & SURROGATE AGENCY, http://www.cledp.com (last
visited Aug. 20, 2016).
97. HAPPY BEGININGS, LLC, http://www.happybeginningseggdonation.com (last visited
Aug. 20, 2016).
98. FIRST SMILE EGG DONATION AGENCY, https://firstsmileeggdonation.com (last vis-
ited Aug. 20, 2016).
99. GRACEFUL CONCEPTION, http://www.gracefulconception.com (last visited Aug. 20,
2016).
100. Egg Donor Program Introduction, FERTILITY BRIDGES, http://www.fertilitybridg
es.com/egg-donor-program/as-egg-donor/?gclid=CIK2leGAv7sCFUQ6Qgodj1
wAfQ (last visited Aug. 20, 2016).
101. CREATIVE LOVE EGG DONOR & SURROGATE AGENCY, supra note 96.
102. GRACEFUL CONCEPTION, supra note 99.
103. Krawiec, supra note 79, at 213.
104. COMM.ON ASSESSING THE MED. RISKS OF HUMAN OOCYTE DONATION FOR STEM
CELL RESEARCH, WORKSHOP REPORT 43 (Linda Giudice, et al. eds., 2007), http://
www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11832&pager1.
105. Id.
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eggs, egg suppliers create the potential for enormous industry profits. These
financial incentives, coupled with other conflicts of interest, an unregulated
market, and a continuing refusal to commission long-term health studies,
create a recipe for ART service providers to exert undue influence over vul-
nerable patients, which heightens the need for governmental intervention.
III. THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME COVERING THE
EGG HARVESTING BUSINESS
The current ART regulatory scheme in the United States is “patch-
work” at best.106 George Annas, a notable bioethicist, professor at the Bos-
ton University School of Public Health, and board member of the Ethics
Advisory Board of the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology
(SART) and the American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), re-
fers to assisted reproductive technology as “the Wild West” of American
medicine.107
In theory, the American regulatory scheme for ART runs the gamut
from Food and Drug Administration (FDA) directives, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) directives, state-level statutes, self-regulatory guidelines
espoused by professional medical societies, and judicial involvement
through tort claims. Given the limited scale of federal and state regulation,
the reality is that the industry is mostly self-regulated. According to the
CDC’s 2013 National Summary Report on Assisted Reproductive Technol-
ogy, 190,773 ART cycles were performed across 467 reporting clinics in the
United States during 2013.108 Despite the fact that the ART industry con-
stitutes a $3 billion dollar industry and assists one million patients across a
variety of services,109 the United States government has taken a laissez faire
approach to its regulation.110
106. Helen M. Alvare´, supra note 17, at 26; Michelle Bercovici, Biotechnology Beyond the
Embryo: Science, Ethics, and Responsible Regulation of Egg Donation to Protect Women’s
Rights, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 193, 198 (2008); Marvin, supra note 27, at 129.
107. Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children: Our Eugenics
Past—Present, and Future?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 125, 179 (2003).
108. 2013 FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT, supra note 19, at 3.
109. Krawiec, supra note 79, at 211 (discussing industry data from 2004).
110. Ovarian Stimulation and Egg Retrieval: Overview & Issues to Consider, REPROD.
HEALTH TECH. PROJECT, http://www.rhtp.org/fertility/assisted/documents/Ovarian
StimulationandEggRetrieval-Issues.pdf (“little to no US government oversight and
regulation”). See also Spar, supra note 74 (suggesting that this approach comes from
America’s typical reluctance to regulate emerging markets combined with the fact
that ART is closely connected to the divisive abortion debate in the US).
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A. Federal Regulations Govern ART Facilities With Limited Binding
Authority
Although you might expect the FDA to be the federal authority with
jurisdiction over the ART industry, in reality, the agency imposes few bind-
ing standards.111 The United States has a long regulatory history that re-
spects the autonomy of the doctor-patient relationship.112 The FDA’s
authority is limited by this principle and by Congressional admonition that
it not directly interfere with the discretion of medical doctors.113 Because
medical practitioners both supervise and perform egg donation procedures,
ART is largely beyond the direct reach of FDA regulation.114 Congress’ de-
sire to maintain this regulatory “hands off” posture was made explicit in the
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 (FCSRCA): “In
developing the certification program, the Secretary [of the Department of
Health and Human Services] may not establish any regulation, standard, or
requirement which has the effect of exercising supervision or control over
the practice of medicine in an assisted reproductive technology program.”115
ART clinics operate largely independently of public funding.116 Legal
precedent regarding the fundamental right of procreation, and the politi-
cally contentious nature of abortion laws, have in part impacted lawmakers’
ability to regulate the ART industry more closely.117 A limitation on federal
funding for procreative exercise leaves IVF clinics separated not only from
the Congressional purse but, notably, from the federal oversight that at-
taches to such Congressional funding.118 As a result, federal regulations de-
111. ASRM Practice Guidelines point to “FDA required” testing for the purposes of de-
termining donor eligibility. However the FDA has merely provided guidelines,
which are just one of many alternatives that can be chosen, so long as the procedures
carried out “satisf[y] the applicable statutes and regulations.” U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION FOR DONORS OF
HUMAN CELLS, TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUE-BASED PRODUCTS (HCT/PS)
1 (2007), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComp-
lianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/Tissue/ucm091345.pdf.
112. Philip M. Rosoff & Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Case for Legal Regulation of
Physicians’ Off-Label Prescribing, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 659 (2011) (“This
society has a strong tradition of deference to physicians’ autonomy and judgment in
the context of the physician-patient relationship.”).
113. See Michael J. Malinowski & Radhika Rao, Legal Limitations on Genetic Research and
the Commercialization of Its Results, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 45, 60 (2006).
114. Id.
115. 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-2(i)(1)(2000) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
116. In part, this is a result of American abortion law jurisprudence, a topic outside the
scope of this paper. See ISLAT Working Group supra note 84, at 652.
117. Helen M. Alvare´, Gonzales v. Carhart: Bringing Abortion Law Back into the Family
Law Fold, 69 MONT. L. REV. 409, 417 (2008); Spar, supra note 74.
118. ISLAT Working Group, supra note 84, at 651–52.
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signed to protect women, such as those participating in research
experiments,119 have not been meaningfully applied to ART. For example,
while the FCSRCA mandated a reporting system administered by the CDC,
this system focuses on the success rate of ART rather than the health of egg
suppliers.120 The CDC is obligated to collect data and report on the success
rates and live births produced by all fertility providers.121 The data collected
in these reports includes the egg recipients’ “medical history (such as infer-
tility diagnosis), clinical information pertaining to the ART procedure, and
information on resulting pregnancies and births.”122 The only information
the CDC report requires about egg suppliers is their age.123
The FDA is indirectly involved in ART through the labeling and dis-
tribution of the hormone injectable drugs used in ovarian hyper-stimula-
tion.124 However, the FDA has no oversight of the medical profession’s use
of the drugs.125 In fact, it is commonplace and legal for physicians to pre-
scribe “drugs for indications, in dosages, and following treatment protocols
different from those expressly approved by the FDA.”126 This is known as
off-label use.127 Use of drugs such as FDA approved Lupron in super-ovula-
tion protocols is considered off-label use.128
119. Malinowski, supra note 107, at 198.
120. The act only requires ART programs to report “pregnancy success rates achieved by
such program.” Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42
U.S.C.A. § 263a-2 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 102–493).
121. TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (2011), http://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/
task_force/reports_publications/execsum.htm. Some commentators are skeptical
about the accuracy of these reports, particularly because CDC site visits to verify the
accuracy of the data are limited. See, e.g., Malinowski, supra note 107, at 182. In
2011, only 35 of 451 reporting clinics were visited for a site check and data quality
control. 2011 FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT, supra note 71, at 6.
122. 2011 FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT, supra note 71, at 4.
123. Id. at 8.
124. The FCSRCA requires ART programs to report “pregnancy success rates achieved by
such program . . . .” 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-1(a)(1)(1992) (Westlaw through Pub. L.
No. 114-244).
125. See Monique C.M. Leahy, Off-Label Use of Prescription Medications, 124 AM. JUR.
TRIALS 487 (2012).
126. Id. at § 1.
127. See id.
128. See Judy Norsigian, Egg Donation Dangers, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS
(2005), http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/GeneWatch/GeneWatchPage.
aspx?pageId=192 (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).
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The FTC investigates deceptive claims made by healthcare providers
engaged in interstate commerce, which includes ART providers.129 The
FTC has the specific authority to investigate claims made in promotional
materials, advertisements, contracts, consent forms, and other point-of-sale
materials.130 In light of the industry’s prevalent use of aggressive direct-to-
consumer marketing tactics, this is an important role.131 If the FTC can
prove that there have been “unfair or deceptive practices,” then it may issue
cease-and-desist orders and impose civil penalties.132 The FTC has entered
into at least five cease-and-desist consent orders with ART providers follow-
ing investigations uncovering inaccurate advertising claims, typically related
to the providers’ claims about the pregnancy success rates of a given fertility
clinic.133 However, given the size of the industry and the number of players,
the FTC plays a minor role in impacting the industry’s marketing practices.
B. The State-by-State Experimental Approach to Gamete Donations Results
In Meager Protection of Suppliers
The void in binding federal directives regarding ART leaves industry
regulation in the hands of individual state legislatures. Under the scheme
developed by the FSCRCA, the CDC developed a model certification pro-
gram to govern ART providers.134 A prototype system was distributed to
state legislatures for enactment at each state’s discretion.135 Not a single state
has fully implemented the model program recommendation.136 The CDC
does not manage state implementation of its program; instead the CDC
delegated its authority to the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology
(SART).137 This delegation and optional certification program have ren-
dered state implementation of the federal oversight plan feeble.138
129. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY:
THE REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 156 (2004), http://bioethics.ge-
orgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/index.html.
130. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Westlaw through P.L. 114–219).
131. See supra Section II (discussing the romanticized marketing used in the industry).
132. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Westlaw through P.L. 114–219).
133. See TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, supra note 121.
134. See Reporting of Pregnancy Success Rates from Assisted Reproductive Technology
Programs, 65 Fed. Reg. 53,310 (Aug. 28, 2000).
135. See Malinowski, supra note 107, at 182.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
2016] B I G  B U S I N E S S  O F  H U M A N  E G G  H A R V E S T I N G 409
Independent of federal directives, state legislatures have variously pro-
tected egg suppliers139 and ignored their interests.140 Some states prescribe
minimum information that must be provided to egg suppliers in order to
constitute informed consent.141 State statutes often declare that egg suppli-
ers have no parental claims to the resulting offspring.142 This protects egg
suppliers from legal obligations that default parentage laws establish in co-
ital offspring. The effect of the default rules is particularly important when
gametes are provided to unacquainted recipients; in those situations, it
seems evident that the intent of the ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval
procedures is not to become pregnant.
At the time of this writing, the state of New York had the most com-
prehensive regulatory system for gamete donation and storage in the na-
tion.143 The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law provides the
legislature with research and recommendations for guidelines and legisla-
tion, including, among other things, how to protect against the particular
risks associated with ART.144 Relevant recommendations deal with issues of
gamete supplier informed consent, results of supplier screening, repeat sup-
pliers, experimental procedures, payments for gametes, and parentage.145
There is a lower but varying degree of regulation by other states. Ma-
ryland prohibits posthumous tissue supply for the purposes of assisted re-
production; which protects the posthumous bodily integrity of a supplier.146
Some states permit payment for gametes, while other states outlaw the prac-
tice,147 but generally, supplier compensation for time and inconvenience is
acceptable.148 California requires the following language to be included
139. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.704 (Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.) (Texas
exempts married women from a requirement that her husband consent to the proce-
dure, if they are donating eggs for the purposes of assisted reproduction by another
female).
140. For example, Louisiana prohibits the sale of ovum but does not address any further
issues protecting egg suppliers. See LA. STAT. ANN § 9:122 (Westlaw through 2016
Legis. Sess.).
141. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1702 (2010); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 2260 (2005); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 52-8.8 (2000); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 14:101.2 (1999).
142. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106 (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 45a-775 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.26.735 (2011) (donor may have rights if there is an explicit written agreement
establishing the intent of the parties to impose parental rights and obligations on the
egg donor).
143. See TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, supra note 121.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. MD. CODE ANN., Health-Gen. § 20-111 (2013).
147. TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, supra note 121.
148. Id.
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clearly and conspicuously in any advertisements seeking egg suppliers in
exchange for compensation:
Egg donation involves a screening process. Not all potential egg
donors are selected. Not all selected egg donors receive the mon-
etary amounts or compensation advertised. As with any medical
procedure, there may be risks associated with human egg dona-
tion. Before an egg donor agrees to begin the egg donation pro-
cess, and signs a legally binding contract, she is required to
receive specific information on the known risks of egg donation.
Consultation with your doctor prior to entering into a donor
contract is advised.149
This kind of regulation encourages donors to make informed choices, and,
ideally, protects donors from aggressive promotional techniques.
A few state legislatures recognize a distinction between eggs harvested
for collaborative reproduction and for medical research purposes, where
compensation for eggs supplied to research is generally prohibited.150 New
York was the first state to allow compensation for supplying eggs for re-
search purposes, including the use of government funds to do so.151 The
ethical debate about the effect that compensation has on egg suppliers is
discussed below.152
The global trend against supplier anonymity (total or limited) has re-
cently spread to the United States.153 In 2011, Washington State became the
first in the United States to eliminate the availability of an anonymous egg
supply.154 Washington now requires a minimum of non-identifying infor-
mation to be available for future offspring,155 though all other states allow
suppliers to choose what kind of information and contact they want to
provide for future offspring.
149. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125325 (2010).
150. California and Massachusetts explicitly ban compensation for egg donations that will
be used for medical research purposes. See id.; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111L,
§ 8 (2005).
151. Libby Nelson, New York State Allows Payment for Egg Donations for Research, N.Y.
TIMES (June 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/26/nyregion/
26stemcell.html?_r=0.
152. Infra Section IV.C.1.
153. Gaia Bernstein, Unintended Consequences: Prohibitions on Gamete Donor Anonymity
and the Fragile Practice of Surrogacy, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 291, 292 (2013).
154. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.750 (2011).
155. Id.
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State statutes also provide a range of supplier screening requirements;
some defer to regulation from the Department of Health,156 while others
provide explicit statutory testing requirements for Human Immuno-defi-
ciency Virus and other sexually transmitted infections.157 Although these
laws “include” and “cover” suppliers, they are not necessarily conceived to
protect them, but rather are designed with egg recipients, future offspring,
and society in mind. The purpose of supplier screening is to prohibit suppli-
ers, through the ART community, from spreading communicable dis-
eases.158 Currently there are no state laws that regulate the number of eggs
or cycles that each supplier is permitted to sell, nor do state laws restrict
ways in which intending parents may choose among potential egg suppli-
ers.159 The loose web of state statutes demonstrates a shortage of political
energy within state legislatures to protect egg suppliers and an absence of
uniformity across states.
C. Voluntary “Self-Regulation,” or Lack Thereof, by Professional Medical
Societies Leaves Egg Suppliers Vulnerable
Because of the gap in statutory and regulatory rules promulgated by
the Federal and State governments, ART is characterized by a “self-regula-
tory” regime.160 Like other medical fields, ART practice lies outside of the
traditional “command-and-control regulatory authority” of the federal gov-
ernment,161 and instead is largely guided through self-regulation by profes-
sional medical societies.162 Where the law of contracts arose in response to
commercial relationships between interested parties, professional relation-
ships have long been considered “fundamentally different from commercial
relationships.”163 The doctor-patient relationship is a fiduciary relationship;
156. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:14 (2014).
157. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-45.3 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2801
(1995); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1644.5 (2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 2151.1 (1988).
158. These statutes are often categorized in such a way as to make this apparent. For
example, Virginia’s law is under “Article 3: Disease Control Measures” and Dela-
ware’s law is under “Regulatory Provisions Concerning Public Health”. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1–45.3 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2801 (1995).
159. Helen M. Alvare´, The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children’s
Rights Perspective, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 31 (2003).
160. See supra Sections III.A & III.B.
161. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Law and Administrative Law: A Marriage Most Conve-
nient, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 4 (2004).
162. See Malinowski, supra note 107, at 181–82.
163. Andrew Fichter, The Law of Doctoring: A Study of the Codification of Medical Profes-
sionalism, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 317, 321 (2009).
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thus, the medical profession is characterized by trust, disinterestedness, spe-
cialization, and self-regulation.164
Currently, ART industry practices are guided by the Society for As-
sisted Reproductive Technologies (SART) and the American Society of Re-
productive Medicine (ASRM).
These societies are dedicated to the practice of reproductive medicine
for the benefit of patients, suppliers, and society.165 Both strive to determine
best practices, to educate, and to advocate on behalf of patients and suppli-
ers.166 SART was commissioned by the CDC to collect data and implement
mandatory reporting requirements regarding fertility success rates under the
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992. Ninety percent
of the fertility clinics in the United States are SART members.167 With the
cooperation of SART, the CDC published the first annual Assisted Repro-
ductive Technology Success Rates Report in 1997, which provided pregnancy
success rates statistics from 1995.168 ASRM’s Ethics Committee and Practice
Committee publish documents that embody the official guidelines for med-
ical professionals and suppliers working with ART. These guides are com-
prehensive and address a wide range of issues. Topics relevant for this
discussion include gamete supplier rights and obligations;169 fertility pro-
gram obligations;170 supplier health and psychological screening, gamete
testing, and supplier selection;171 fertility program obligations for record
keeping and informed consent;172 multiple supplier compensation
schemes;173 and concerns about limitations on repeat suppliers.174
164. See id. at 321, 335.
165. They do not have a mission statement that includes any concern for egg providers.
See Mission Statement, SOC’Y OF ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., http://www.sart.org/
Mission_Statement/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2016); Mission Statement, AM. SOC’Y FOR
REPROD. MED., http://www.asrm.org/mission/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).
166. See id.
167. What is SART?, SOC’Y OF ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., http://www.sart.org/
What_is_SART/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2016).
168. See Archived ART Reports and Spreadsheets, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art/reports/archive.html (last visited Aug. 20,
2016)
169. Ethics Comm., Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Interests, Obligations, and Rights of the
Donor in Gamete Donation, 91 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 22, 22 (2009).
170. Id.
171. Recommendations for Gamete and Embryo Donation, supra note 75, at 47.
172. Id.
173. Ethics Comm., Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Financial Compensation of Oocyte Do-
nors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305 (2007) [hereinafter Financial Compensation of
Oocyte Donors].
174. Practice Comm., Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Repetitive Oocyte Donation, 90 FER-
TILITY & STERILITY S194, S194–95 (2008).
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The problem with ASRM guidelines is not necessarily that they em-
body bad policy, but rather, that compliance is strictly optional and the
guidelines are easily ignored.175 These publications are available at SART’s
website with the following disclaimer:
[The ASRM guidelines] are not intended to be a protocol to be
applied in all situations, and cannot substitute for the individual
judgment of the treating physicians based on their knowledge of
their patients and specific circumstances. The recommendations
in these guidelines may not be the most appropriate approach
for all patients. Medical science and ethics are constantly chang-
ing, and clinicians should not rely solely on these guidelines.176
SART publishes guidelines that, by its own admission, are neither compre-
hensive nor suitable for total reliance. Therefore, it is no surprise that the
guidelines ineffectively constrain the industry.
Supplier compensation is a good example of an aspect of the industry
rife with ASRM guideline violations. The guidelines regarding supplier
compensation state, “[t]otal payments to [suppliers] in excess of $5,000 re-
quire justification and sums above $10,000 are not appropriate.”177 Further-
more the guidelines indicate that:
To avoid putting a price on human gametes or selectively valuing
particular human traits, compensation should not vary according
to the planned use of the oocytes (e.g., research or clinical care),
the number or quality of oocytes retrieved, the outcome of prior
supplier cycles, or the supplier’s ethnic or other personal
characteristics.178
Whether these guidelines embody the appropriate policies is debatable. Re-
gardless, studies indicate that these voluntary guidelines go unheeded. In
2010, a study of supplier-seeking advertisements in newspapers on univer-
sity campuses across the country demonstrated that in almost a quarter of
the advertisements the offered compensation exceeded the maximum
ASRM guideline.179 Furthermore, an increase of an egg supplier’s SAT score
175. Hiltzik, supra note 23.
176. Practice Committee Documents, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED, http://www.asrm
.org/Guidelines/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
177. Financial Compensation of Oocyte Donors, supra note 173, at 305.
178. Id.
179. AARON D. LEVINE, HASTINGS CTR., SELF-REGULATION, COMPENSATION, AND THE
ETHICAL RECRUITMENT OF OOCYTE DONORS 25, 31 (2010).
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by 100 points was linked to an increase in compensation of $2,350.180 In
2012, another study exploring IVF clinic and agency compliance found that
“considerable numbers were noncompliant with ASRM’s guidelines that
prohibit varying compensation based on a supplier’s traits (thirty-four per-
cent), and recommend an age of twenty-one years or older (forty-one per-
cent), and presentation of risks alongside compensation (fifty-six
percent).”181 These rates of violation clearly demonstrate that attempts to
self-regulate are not successful.
D. Negligible Effect of Judicial Enforcement Through Egg Supplier Tort
Claims
Since the federal government takes a hands-off position in its regula-
tion of the practice of medicine, the professional medical community is
permitted to establish its own standard of care.182 Medical malpractice
claims, under the province of state law, are brought in actions for negli-
gence. Instead of relying on the “reasonably prudent person” standard, as is
typical in negligence claims, a medical doctor is measured against a standard
established by his/her peers within the medical community. “As long as a
doctor follows the medical standard or custom, he/she is not negligent, re-
gardless of how risky the custom or how unnecessary.”183 Doctors owe their
patients a duty that comports with the minimum standard of care. When
this duty is breached and patient harm results, patients can maintain a cause
of action in state court for damages.184 State laws typically govern these
medical malpractice actions.185
Egg suppliers harmed by fertility treatments have brought surprisingly
few tort actions. Given the health risks involved in the medical procedures,
and the volume of procedures, one would expect to find more medical mal-
practice cases brought against doctors and more products liability actions
against fertility drug manufacturers. There are many cases involving deter-
minations of parental rights for children as a result of assisted reproduc-
180. Id.
181. Jason Keehn et al., Recruiting Egg Donors Online: An Analysis of In Vitro Fertilization
Clinic and Agency Websites’ Adherence to American Society for Reproductive Medicine
Guidelines, 98 FERTILITY & STERILITY 995, 995 (2012).
182. Philip M. Rosoff & Doriane Lambelet Coleman, supra note 112, at 666.
183. Id. at 666 n.63.
184. E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Statute of Limitations Applicable to Malpractice Action
Against Physician, Surgeon, Dentist, or Similar Practitioner, 80 A.L.R.2D 320 (1961).
185. William M. Sage, The Role of Medicare in Medical Malpractice Reform, 9 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 217, 219 (2006) (“Malpractice [historically] has been a state law
issue, while health care is governed increasingly by federal law.”).
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tion,186 often involving the disposition of frozen embryos in cases of
separated parents,187 as well as suits determining the liability of health insur-
ance companies related to assisted reproductive technology expenses188 and
civil actions for loss of cryopreserved genetic tissue.189 However, as of this
writing, only a few on-point cases with egg supplier plaintiffs exist.190
One such on-point case is Steinmann v. Doyle, which involved a medi-
cal malpractice action filed in 2011 against fertility clinic doctors for harm
suffered by the plaintiff from ovarian hyper-stimulation.191 Although she
lived in Florida, Amanda Steinmann traveled to Connecticut to undergo
ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval procedures at the Connecticut Fertility
Associates (CFA).192 She intended to supply her eggs to CFA for use in third
party fertility treatments.193 Six days into the hormonal treatment, Stein-
mann presented with symptoms of ovarian hyper-stimulation syndrome,
complaining of pain in her “lower right quadrant.”194 She was admitted to
the emergency room and stayed overnight. The hospital’s physician found
“significantly enlarged ovaries and a suspected ruptured ovarian cyst,” but
determined that there was “no obvious source for her problem” and that she
186. See, e.g., D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 38 Fla. L. Weekly S812 (Fla. 2013) (the egg donor in a
same-sex relationship did not waive her parental rights by signing a standard consent
form, where the couple intended to raise the child as their own); A.A.B. v. B.O.C.,
112 So. 3d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (the father was a sperm donor under the
statute and had no parental rights for the offspring that resulted from artificial in-
semination); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005) (court held that statute sever-
ing the parental rights of a sperm donor did not apply to an egg donor providing an
egg to her lesbian partner even when the petition was filed after the domestic part-
nership ended).
187. See e.g., Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (custody of pre-
embryos should be determined by the agreement that reflects the intention of par-
ties), appeal denied 996 N.E.2d 24 (Ill. 2013); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y.
1998) (ex-wife filed action for sole custody of five frozen pre-zygotes created during
the marriage, Judge held that agreements between progenitors are presumptively
valid, and the agreement here required the embryos to be donated to research).
188. See, e.g., New Life Agency, Inc. v. Beitler Servs., Inc., No. B224724, 2012 WL
593142 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2012) (dispute between two insurance companies
over liability in relation to coverage of medical expenses of a surrogacy contract);
Northrup v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utica-Watertown Inc., 652 N.Y.S.2d 902,
903 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
189. See, e.g., Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona, 121 P.3d 1256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); Witt v.
Yale-New Haven Hosp., 977 A.2d 779 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008).
190. Durrell, supra note 68, at 190 (“[T]here are no reported cases specifically relating to
damage claims by egg donors[.]”).
191. Steinmann v. Doyle, No. CV 116017158S, 2011 WL 2436698, at *1 (Conn. Super.
Ct. May 24, 2011) (unpublished opinion).
192. Steinmann, 2011 WL 2436698, at *1.
193. Steinmann, 2011 WL 2436698, at *1.
194. Steinmann, 2011 WL 2436698, at *1.
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“would continue on the ovarian stimulation protocol.”195 After being dis-
charged from the hospital, Steinmann returned to CFA for monitoring,
which showed that her estrogen levels were elevated. The ovarian hyper-
stimulation stage was completed when hCG was administered two days af-
ter her discharge, and a successful surgical egg retrieval procedure fol-
lowed.196 Shortly after Steinmann’s return to Florida, she suffered severe
pain; a physical examination demonstrated that her ovaries were “severely
enlarged and otherwise damaged.”197
Of the five named defendants, one has been dismissed on settlement
terms not publicly available.198 If the four remaining defendants do not set-
tle the claim, this would be the first adjudication of a claim brought by an
egg supplier plaintiff regarding sub-standard medical treatment based on a
conflict of interest in connection with her ovarian hyper-stimulation and
egg retrieval procedure.199
While courts are authorized to hear personal injury claims to protect
egg suppliers, as of this writing, there is no judicial opinion that deals pre-
cisely with the physical and psychological harms caused to third party egg
suppliers.200 The absence of case law has not been explained. At least one
barrier is the dearth of long-term scientific studies that confirm the health
risks of ovarian hyper-stimulation,201 which may present extreme difficulty
in establishing causation, a necessary element of a plaintiff’s case at trial.202
There may also be personal reasons an egg supplier is uninterested in
pursuing a public trial or initiating a lawsuit available for public inspection.
Given the private nature of the decision to be an egg supplier and to partici-
pate in collaborative reproduction, egg suppliers may wish to keep their
remedial pursuits out of public view. Waiver documents and misinforma-
tion from clinics about the health risks of the procedure may also deter
potential plaintiffs with valid claims from approaching an attorney in the
first instance. For example, an egg supplier who has suffered from medical
195. Steinmann, 2011 WL 2436698, at *1.
196. Steinmann, 2011 WL 2436698, at *1–2.
197. Steinmann, 2011 WL 2436698, at *2.
198. Steinmann, 2011 WL 2436698, at *2.
199. See generally Options Nat’l Fertility Registry v. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., No. C
07-5238 JF (HRL), 2009 WL 4572769 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2009) (an egg donor
plaintiff alleged a policy of “egg-sharing” without the consent of egg donors, but the
case was fraught with procedural problems and dismissed on those grounds).
200. Durrell, supra note 68, at 190 (“there are no reported cases specifically relating to
damage claims by egg donors”). The author’s research did not demonstrate any rele-
vant briefs, pleadings or motions either.
201. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
202. See discussion infra Section IV.A (the benefit to industry defendants of that research
deficiency presents an unfortunate incentive).
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complications, but who signed the clinic’s disclaimer of liability, may feel
she has no legal recourse. In addition, the fact that clinics do not always
share the whole truth about the health risks involved means that an egg
supplier may not associate the egg harvesting procedure with her symptoms.
Egg suppliers may also be deterred from legal action by feelings of regret
and shame that may follow supplying eggs.203 Regardless of the underlying
reasons, regulation of the assisted reproductive technology industry has not
come through judicial intervention.
IV. MAJOR FAILURES OF THE CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME OVER
THE ART INDUSTRY
Jessica Schneider, a young, healthy, Stanford graduate was caught un-
dergoing a non-therapeutic procedure without knowing the life-threatening
risks because the United States regulatory scheme was unsuccessful. This
system failed to provide her with the requisite information to make a sound
decision and failed to protect her against the overbearing techniques of the
industry. These failures directly resulted in her premature death at thirty-
one years old. The patchwork of regulatory devices in the United States has
largely left the ART industry to engage in self-regulation. The failures of
self-regulation create a regulatory void, and as a result, the industry has been
able to selfishly pursue profits without restraint. Unfortunately, this comes
with a price, and egg suppliers are bearing the cost. The current system has
failed to monitor the short- and long-term risks of egg harvesting, failed to
establish the opportunity for informed consent, and failed to protect against
the coercive pressures of aggressive marketing techniques.
A. No Long-term Studies Substantiate the Safety Claims of Superovulation
and the Egg Retrieval Procedure
The medical risks of the procedures required to provide eggs are
largely unknown, and they are borne exclusively by egg suppliers. The lack
of studies is most probably the result of the conflict of interest of ART
clinics, which creates a need for the government to step in and fund these
studies for the protection of egg suppliers.
203. See, e.g., COMM. ON ASSESSING THE MED. RISKS OF HUMAN OOCYTE DONATION
FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH, WORKSHOP REPORT 45–46 (Linda Guidice et al. eds.,
2007), https://www.nap.edu/read/11832/chapter/1; Leah Campbell, Why I Regret
Donating My Eggs, YAHOO! NEWS (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/news/
why-i-regret-donating-my-1319025848811574.html?ref=GS; Boodman, supra note
62; Katie O’Reilly, I Wish I Hadn’t Donated My Eggs, BUZZFEED NEWS (June 30,
2015, 9:20 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/katieoreilly/i-wish-i-hadnt-donated-
my-eggs?utm_term=.ggvpkvBDw#.afYLDQmxa.
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Despite the fact that the first successful IVF birth occurred more than
thirty-five years ago, only limited scientific data is available regarding the
superovulation and egg retrieval process that makes IVF possible.204 Many
have commented on the concerns caused by this absence.205 Even the
ASRM spokesperson, Sean Tipton, admits that there are no specific studies
of the long-term effects on egg suppliers.206 In particular, no long-term
study definitively demonstrates that super-ovulation and egg retrieval are
safe for egg suppliers. Dr. Suzanne Parisian, a former Chief Medical Officer
of the FDA, has stated: “Pharmaceutical firms have not been required by
either the government or physicians to collect safety data for IVF drugs
regarding risk of cancer or other serious health conditions despite the drugs
having been available in the United States for several decades.”207
Despite this dearth of scientific data, many publications deceivingly
declare the relative safety of the procedure.208 Even the ASRM acknowledges
this: “Currently, there are no clearly documented long-term risks associated
with oocyte donation, and as such, no definitive data upon which to base
absolute recommendations.”209 These admissions by industry regulators are
disturbing. Egg suppliers have been providing eggs and supporting the
growth of the industry without being monitored for long-term health risks
for many years.
Conflicts of interest account, at least in part, for the failure to compre-
hensively track and study egg suppliers.210 As the gatekeepers to the limited
supply of eggs, potential egg suppliers have been shielded from information
revealing the health risks of egg harvesting because it could diminish fertility
clinics’ egg supply.211 Diane Tober of the University of California, San Fran-
cisco, is conducting a study of egg suppliers and has found that most egg
suppliers are told that the chances of complications are under one per-
cent.212 However, her study is showing that complications requiring bed rest
204. See, e.g., Kramer et al., supra note 90, at 3144–45.
205. See Hiltzik, supra note 23.
206. Id.
207. Michelle Bercovici, Biotechnology Beyond the Embryo: Science, Ethics, and Responsible
Regulation of Egg Donation to Protect Women’s Rights, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 193,
195 (2008).
208. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 129, at 25 (describes the
ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval producers as “[r]isks and complications are
low”); Durrell, supra note 68, at 187 (“generally marketed as a safe procedure”);
Robert Klitzman & Mark V. Sauer, Payment of Egg Donors in Stem Cell Research in
the USA, 18 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 603, 604 (2009).
209. Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome, supra note 41, at S195.
210. Hiltzik, supra note 23.
211. See id.
212. Id.
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and inpatient hospital admission are closer to thirty percent.213 Another sur-
vey evaluating egg donors retrospectively showed results where thirty per-
cent of egg donors had some OHSS following donation, and eleven and a
half percent had complications that included paracentesis and/or hospitali-
zation.214 Given the seriousness of the health risks that may be substantiated
by these studies, government intervention is not only warranted but critical.
These studies will provide much needed information to ensure that ART
protocols are safe for all involved parties, particularly for egg suppliers who
are vulnerable to both commercial influence and abuse by those tempted to
overuse the technology.215
The absence of research to inform the policy and protocols in this
field is a critical failure. The government should initiate a change through
investing in the studies necessary to fill in the gaps of scientific knowledge.
ART industry players’ failure to proactively generate these studies comes at
the expense of all patients involved.
B. Egg Suppliers Cannot Provide Informed Consent to
Egg Harvesting
“[K]nowledgeable decisions on reproducing and having children,
whether technology is involved or not, can and should be made by the
people and the families immediately affected by such decisions.”216 Com-
prehensive information is a prerequisite for autonomous decision-making.
Parties involved in ART may be getting accurate information, but without
long-term and comprehensive studies they may not have access to complete
information. This is the difference between “no known evidence” and “no
evidence.”217 Nevertheless, physicians have a legal obligation to obtain in-
formed consent prior to treatment.218
Informed consent is a legal doctrine that stems from a fundamental
right recognized in the American legal system that, “[e]very human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body . . . .”219 Because the doctor-patient relationship is char-
acterized by fiduciary responsibilities, there is a heavy burden on the physi-
cian to ensure that informed consent is meaningfully obtained.220 “True
213. Id.
214. Kramer et al., supra note 92, at 3146.
215. See Malinowski, supra note 107, at 199 [citation omitted].
216. Robert P.S. Jansen, Evidence-based Ethics and the Regulation of Reproduction, 12
HUMAN REPROD. 2068, 2074 (1997).
217. Kramer et al., supra note 90, at 3144.
218. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 721, Westlaw (database updated 2016).
219. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
220. See supra note 218.
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consent to what happens to one’s self is the informed exercise of a choice,
and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options avail-
able and the risks attendant upon each.”221 In some circumstances, a physi-
cian may be justified in withholding information from the patient about the
risks of a particular treatment based on the concern that a patient will be
adversely affected by the specific disclosure.222 This exception is known as
the “therapeutic privilege.”223
However, in the context of egg donation or any other elective proce-
dure, by definition, this privilege cannot be invoked.224 On the contrary,
“[i]n cases of elective medical treatment of any sort, full disclosure of the
risks must be made because the patient’s medical condition would not be
jeopardized by taking no action at all.”225 Furthermore, a physician has a
duty to disclose “personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether
research-related or economic, if these interests may affect the physician’s
professional judgment, and a doctor’s failure to disclose such interests may
give rise to a cause of action for performing medical procedures without
informed consent.”226
The New York State Life and Law Task Force’s extensive research on
ART found that “[t]he process of obtaining informed consent to assisted
reproduction is seriously deficient. There is considerable evidence that phy-
sicians provide incomplete or misleading information about benefits and
risks.”227 As a result of this research, the Task Force received a grant to create
literature for both practitioners and consumers “in order to address the con-
flicting information that is often provided in regards to the technology.”228
Informed consent has not sufficiently protected egg suppliers against
the conflict of interest raised by fertility clinics that manipulate the system
by withholding important facts from patients who believe they are getting
complete information.229 The common misperception of the risks of the
procedures required by egg donation is evidence of a failure to achieve
meaningful informed consent despite written and signed consent forms.230
A 2010 study of egg suppliers found that an alarming twenty percent did
221. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780–81 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
222. 15 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 711, Westlaw (database updated 2016).
223. Id.
224. See supra note 218.
225. Id.
226. Supra note 222.
227. See TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, supra note 121.
228. Id.
229. See Barbara L. Atwell, The Modern Age of Informed Consent, 40 U. RICH. L. REV.
591, 607 (2006).
230. See e.g., Boodman, supra note 62.
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not know about the health risks involved.231 The lack of research data with
which to accurately determine health risks for egg donors casts serious
doubt on whether informed consent can be achieved in this context.232
However, even with the information currently available, additional safe-
guards are needed to protect the egg donor’s autonomous choice, particu-
larly against abuses by interested third parties at fertility clinics.233
C. Potential Egg Suppliers are Burdened by
Aggressive Direct Marketing Techniques
The ART industry uses aggressive marketing techniques to convert
potential egg suppliers into actual egg suppliers and to satisfy the strong
market demand for oocytes.
1. Potential Egg Suppliers Face Strong Financial Incentives
to Become Suppliers
The debate over whether egg donor compensation should be permit-
ted at all, or to what extent, includes perspectives arguing for a wide range
of compensation levels.234 Advocates against compensation, like the Cana-
dian legislature235 and major scientific institutions,236 are concerned by the
vulnerability of women in financial hardship.237 Egg brokers notoriously tar-
get women in financial stress, most notably graduate and undergraduate
students studying at universities across the country.238 Financial incentives
are sometimes shockingly high, up to $50,000 when egg brokers seek
suppliers with specific traits such as an Ivy League education or a specific
height, eye color, and ethnicity, etc.239 This degree of financial
231. Id.
232. Kramer et al., supra note 90, at 3145.
233. Id.
234. Hiltzik, supra note 23.
235. Alison Motluk, The Human Egg Trade: How Canada’s fertility laws are failing donors,
doctors, and parents, THE WALRUS (April 12, 2010), https://thewalrus.ca/the-human-
egg-trade/.
236. Including the National Academy of Sciences and the California Institute for Regen-
erative Medicine. Hiltzik, supra note 23.
237. See Hiltzik, supra note 23; Motluk, supra note 235.
238. Michelle Bercovici, Biotechnology Beyond the Embryo: Science, Ethics, and Responsible
Regulation of Egg Donation to Protect Women’s Rights, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 193,
196 (2008); Carlene Hempel, Golden Eggs: Drowning in credit-card debt and student
loans, young women are selling their eggs for big payoffs. But can they really make the
right medical and moral decisions when they’re tempted with $15,000?, BOS. GLOBE
(June 25, 2006), http://archive.boston.com/news/globe/magazine/articles/2006/06/
25/golden_eggs/.
239. See Kolata, supra note 64; Ken Schwartz, Ivy Eggs, BUS. TODAY, Aug. 5, 2006 at 1.
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compensation is a tempting lure to potential egg suppliers, and thus a sig-
nificant concern. This amount of money encourages a person to disregard
the risks of the procedure, particularly a person in financial stress.240
Most states prohibit compensation for eggs that are used for research
purposes.241 For example, Florida’s Attorney General suggested a state con-
stitutional amendment to allow stem cell research, “if and only, under con-
ditions that satisfy applicable requirements for informed consent and do not
involve financial inducement to any [supplier].”242 Some have proffered that
the concern for vulnerable donors is higher for research eggs because scien-
tists in that context are not worried about “quality” but simply “quan-
tity.”243 Yet the medical procedure is the same regardless of the purpose the
harvested eggs are to serve, and this inequity does not seem justified.244
The ASRM guidelines suggest that $5,000 is reasonable compensa-
tion; payment from $5,001 to $10,000 should be justified with receipts for
expenses; anything above $10,000 is inappropriate.245 The ASRM did not
provide a rationale to justify these values, but since they are official guide-
lines they certainly demonstrate that compensation of $35,000 or $50,000
grossly exceeds recommended practice.246 Additional studies are needed to
consider the impact of compensation on potential egg supplier behavior.247
Compensation for time, expenses, inconvenience, and exposure to known
and unknown health risks should be reasonably limited with well-structured
regulation.
2. Coercive Pressure is Exacerbated With Appeals to Emotion
The aggressive marketing tactics of the industry contribute to an envi-
ronment of coercion. Collectively, the fertility industry vigorously targets
240. DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS
DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 44 (2006); Marvin, supra note 27, at
127–131.
241. Diane Tober, The Politics of Women’s Eggs, UNDARK (June 10, 2016), http://un-
dark.org/article/the-price-and-politics-of-womens-eggs/.
242. Advisory Opinion to Attorney Gen. re Funding of Embryonic Stem Cell Research,
959 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 2007).
243. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Leveling the field for human egg donors, L.A.
TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/13/opinion/la-oe-cahn-
egg-donation-california-20130714.
244. Klitzman & Sauer, supra note 208, at 603–08.
245. Financial Compensation of Oocyte Donors, supra note 173, at 308.
246. Id.
247. Klitzman & Sauer, supra note 208, 603–08 (2009).
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eligible women to convert them into egg suppliers.248 Advertisements and
websites are created to manipulate maternal instincts and create the warm
fuzzy feelings that will convince potential suppliers into becoming suppli-
ers.249 This appeal to altruism is reflected in egg supplier’s motivation, as
surveys show that this was the primary stated reason for interest in becom-
ing an egg supplier.250 Websites commonly emphasize how suppliers give
the gift of life.251 Egg Donation, Inc., “the oldest and largest egg donation
agency,” prominently displays their corporate tag line, “Where Dreams
Come True,” on the upper left heading of their website.252 This romanti-
cizes the baby-making business, and it is another tool used to lure egg sup-
pliers. An attempt to curb the effect of this practice should come from
regulation requiring conspicuous language on supplier-seeking advertise-
ments even more stringent than what was passed in California.253
CONCLUSION
The ART industry needs more regulation. Human egg harvesting is a
unique sort of transaction, one that does not fit into a standard mold. As a
248. These agencies target college students in particular. See Carlene Hempel, Golden
Eggs, BOS. GLOBE (June 25, 2006), http://archive.boston.com/news/globe/magazine/
articles/2006/06/25/golden_eggs/.
249. This is evidenced in the names of some of the egg brokers and agencies: “Creative
Love Egg Donation,” “Happy Beginnings,” “First Smile Egg Donation Agency,” and
“Graceful Conception.” CREATIVE LOVE EGG DONOR & SURROGATE AGENCY,
supra note 96; HAPPY BEGINNINGS, LLC, supra note 97; FIRST SMILE EGG DONA-
TION AGENCY, supra note 98; GRACEFUL CONCEPTION, supra note 99.
250. COMM. ON ASSESSING THE MED. RISKS OF HUMAN OOCYTE DONATION FOR STEM
CELL RESEARCH, ASSESSING THE MEDICAL RISKS OF HUMAN OOCYTE DONATION
FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH: WORKSHOP REPORT, 43 (Linda Giudice, et al. eds.,
2007), http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11832&page=R1.
251. See FERTILITY BRIDGES, http://fertilitybridges.com/egg-donor-program/as-egg-donor
(last visited Sept. 11, 2016) (“Congratulations! You are taking the first step in creat-
ing a miracle. How often do you get to be a part of something so spectacular?”); see
also CREATIVE LOVE EGG DONATION, http://www.cledp.com (last visited Sept. 11,
2016) (“Parenthood is magical, it is a gift, a miracle!”); GRACEFUL CONCEPTION,
http://www.gracefulconception.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2016) (“Sharing the gift of
life”).
252. EGG DONOR INC., https://www.eggdonor.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2016).
253. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125325 (2010) (requiring the following notice
to be included in egg donation advertisements: “Egg donation involves a screening
process. Not all potential egg donors are selected. Not all selected egg donors receive
the monetary amounts or compensation advertised. As with any medical procedure,
there may be risks associated with human egg donation. Before an egg donor agrees
to begin the egg donation process, and signs a legally binding contract, she is re-
quired to receive specific information on the known risks of egg donation. Consulta-
tion with your doctor prior to entering into a donor contract is advised.”).
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result, the standard regulatory scheme does not  protect egg suppliers. Egg
suppliers in the United States should function within a framework of safety
and information. Unfortunately, the system in place does not provide either
of those things, and egg suppliers bear the risks and costs of this failure.
This is unacceptable exploitation. The substantive justifications described
by this Note compel significant changes in the regulation of egg harvesting.
We must have changes in the law to protect both a woman’s choice and her
health.
